The design baseline is a dead network
In the summer of 2022 the Excalibur round was one of the most effective weapons in Ukraine. A GPS-guided 155mm shell that could land within meters of a target from twenty-five miles out. Its hit rate ran around 70%. By mid-2023 that number had collapsed to under 10%. The Washington Post reported the cause in May 2024. Russian electronic warfare units learned to jam the GPS signal the round depended on. The shell still flew. The explosive still worked. The link died and the weapon became a very expensive way to miss.
This is the pattern that should keep every program office up at night. A capability that depends on a signal inherits every weakness of that signal. And the adversary knows it. CSIS documented China's rapid buildout of electronic warfare and communications infrastructure on its outposts near the South China Sea. Jamming arrays and signal intelligence sites positioned to blind and silence anything that operates in reach. The investment thesis is simple. Attacking the link is cheaper than attacking the platform. No missile required.
Most software built for defense still assumes a reachable server. The assumption hides in every architecture diagram with an arrow pointing to a cloud. Every one of those arrows is a single point of failure the adversary can attack without firing a shot. DDIL is not an edge case your system falls back into. It is the design baseline your system is built on. EdgeLance made that choice at the foundation and this paper explains what the architecture looks like as a result.